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Abstract
We present a new partial equilibrium theory of price adjustment, based on con-
sumer loss aversion. In line with prospect theory, the consumers’ perceived utility
losses from price increases are weighted more heavily than the perceived utility
gains from price decreases of equal magnitude. Price changes are evaluated rel-
ative to an endogenous reference price, which depends on the consumers’ ratio-
nal price expectations from the recent past. By implication, demand responses
are more elastic for price increases than for price decreases and thus firms face a
downward-sloping demand curve that is kinked at the consumers’ reference price.
Firms adjust their prices flexibly in response to variations in this demand curve, in
the context of an otherwise standard dynamic neoclassical model of monopolistic
competition. The resulting theory of price adjustment is starkly at variance with
past theories. We find that - in line with the empirical evidence - prices are more
sluggish upwards than downwards in response to temporary demand shocks, while
they are more sluggish downwards than upwards in response to permanent demand
shocks.
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1 Introduction
This paper presents a theory of price sluggishness based on consumer loss aversion,
along the lines of prospect theory (Kahnemann and Tversky, 1979). The theory has
distinctive implications, which are starkly at variance with major existing theories of
price adjustment. In particular, the theory implies that prices are more sluggish up-
wards than downwards in response to temporary demand shocks, while they are more
sluggish downwards than upwards in response to permanent demand shocks.
These implications turn out to be consonant with recent empirical evidence. Though
this evidence has not thus far attracted much explicit attention, it is clearly implicit in
a range of influential empirical results. For instance, Hall et al. (2000) document that
firms mostly accommodate negative temporary demand shifts by temporary price cuts,
yet they are reluctant to temporarily increase their prices in response to positive tem-
porary demand shifts. Furthermore, the empirical evidence provided by Kehoe and
Midrigan (2008) indicates that temporary price reductions are - on average - larger and
much more frequent than temporary price increases, implying that prices are relatively
downward responsive.
By contrast, in the event of a permanent demand shock, the empirical evidence
points towards a stronger upward flexibility of prices for a wide variety of industrialized
countries (Kandil, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2002a,b 2010; Weise, 1999; Karras 1996;
Karras and Stokes 1999) as well as developing countries (Kandil, 1998).
While current theories of price adjustment (e.g. Taylor, 1979; Rotemberg, 1982;
Calvo, 1983; among many others) fail to account for these empirical regularities, this
paper offers a possible theoretical rationale.
The basic idea underlying our theory is simple. Price increases are associated with
utility losses for consumers, whereas price decreases are associated with utility gains.
In the spirit of prospect theory, losses are weighted more heavily than gains of equal
magnitude. Consequently, demand responses are more elastic to price increases than to
price decreases. The result is a kinked demand curve1, for which the kink depends on
the consumers’ reference price. In the spirit of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006), we model
the reference price as the consumers’ rational price expectations. We assume that con-
sumers know, with a one period lag, whether any given demand shock is temporary or
permanent. Permanent shocks induce changes in the consumers’ rational price expec-
tations and thereby in their reference price, while temporary shocks do not.
Given the demand shock is temporary, the kink of the demand curve implies that
sufficiently small shocks do not affect the firm’s price. This is the case of price rigidity.
For larger shocks, the firm’s price will respond temporarily, but the size of the response
will be asymmetric for positive and negative shifts of equal magnitude. Since negative
shocks move the firm along the relatively steep portion of the demand curve, prices
decline stronger to negative shocks than they increase to equiproportionate positive
shocks.
By contrast, given the demand shock is permanent, the firm can foresee not only
the change in demand following its immediate pricing decision, but also the resulting
change in the consumers’ reference price. A rise in the reference price raises the firms’
long-run profits (since the reference price is located at the kink of the demand curve),
1Modeling price sluggishness by means of a kinked demand curve is of course a well-trodden path.
Sweezy (1939) and Hall and Hitch (1939) modeled price rigidity in an oligopolistic framework along these
lines. In these models, oligopolistic firms do not change their prices flexibly because of their expected
asymmetric competitor’s reactions to their pricing decisions. A game theoretic foundation of such model is
presented by Maskin and Tirole (1988).
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whereas a fall in the reference price lowers long-run profits, a phenomenon which we
term the reference-price updating effect. On this account, firms are averse to initiating
permanent price reductions. By implication, prices are more sluggish downwards than
upwards for permanent demand shocks.
These results are extremely important for the conduct of monetary policy, since
they imply that the sign of the asymmetry of price adjustment depends on the per-
sistence of the underlying demand shock. In particular, if temporary demand shocks
are interpreted as non-persistent and permanent demand shocks as fully persistent, our
analysis implies that there exists a balance point (i.e. an intermediate degree of per-
sistence of the shock) at which the asymmetry reverses. For shocks less persistent
than the balance point prices are more sluggish upwards than downwards, while they
are more sluggish downwards than upwards for more persistent shocks. Whether the
degree of persistence at the balance point is relatively high or low depends on the ad-
justment speed of the reference price and on the firm’s discount factor. An increase
in the adjustment speed of the reference price, as well as in the firm’s discount factor,
strengthens the role of the reference-price updating effect, increasing upward flexibility
and downward sluggishness at any given positive persistence of the shock. Therefore,
the balance point will be associated with a lower level of persistence. To the best of
our knowledge, there is no other paper studying the ramifications of the persistence of
the demand shock for asymmetric price adjustment.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section
3 presents our general model setup and in Section 4 we analyze the effects of various
demand shocks on prices, both analytically and numerically. Section 5 concludes.
2 Relation to the Literature
We now consider the empirical evidence suggesting that prices respond imperfectly and
asymmetrically to exogenous positive and negative shocks of equal magnitude, and that
the implied asymmetry depends on whether the shock is permanent or temporary.
There is much empirical evidence for the proposition that, with regard to perma-
nent demand shocks, prices are generally more responsive to positive shocks than to
negative ones. For example, in the context of monetary policy shocks, Kandil (1996,
2002b), Kandil (1995), and Weise (1999) find support for the United States over a large
range of different samples. Moreover, Kandil (1995) and Karras and Stokes (1999) sup-
ply evidence for large panels of industrialized OECD countries, while Karras (1996)
provides evidence for developing countries. In the case of the United States, Kandil
(2001, 2002a) shows that the asymmetry also prevails in response to permanent gov-
ernment spending shocks. Kandil (1999, 2006, 2010), on the other hand, looks directly
at permanent aggregate demand shocks and also confirms the asymmetry for a large
set of industrialized countries as well as for a sample of disaggregated industries in
the United States. Comparing a large set of industrialized and developing countries,
Kandil (1998) finds that the asymmetry is even stronger for many developing countries
compared to industrialized ones.
In addition to the asymmetric price reaction in response to permanent demand
shocks, the above studies also find an asymmetric reaction of output. They show that
output responds significantly less to permanent positive demand shocks relative to neg-
ative ones. This asymmetry – which is also predicted by our model (as shown below) –
is further documented by a large body of empirical literature that explicitly focuses on
output. For example, DeLong and Summers (1988), Cover (1992), Thoma (1994), and
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Ravn and Sola (2004) show for the United States that positive changes in the rate of
money growth induce much weaker output reductions than negative changes in the rate
of money supply. Morgan (1993) and Ravn and Sola (2004) confirm this asymmetry,
when monetary policy is conducted via changes in the federal funds rate. Additional
evidence is provided by Tan et al. (2010) for Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Thailand and by Mehrara and Karsalari (2011) for Iran.
There is also significant empirical evidence for the proposition that, with regard to
temporary demand shocks, prices are generally less responsive to positive shocks than
to negative ones. For example, the survey by Hall et al. (2000) indicates that firms re-
gard price increases as response to temporary increases in demand to be among the least
favorable options. Instead, firms rather employ more workers, extend overtime work,
or increase capacities. By contrast, managers of firms state that a temporary fall in
demand is much more likely to lead to a price cut. Further evidence for the asymmetry
in response to temporary demand shocks is provided by Kehoe and Midrigan (2008),
who analyze temporary price movements at Dominick’s Finer Foods retail chain with
weekly store-level data from 86 stores in the Chicago area. They find that temporary
price reductions are much more frequent than temporary price increases and that, on
average, temporary price cuts are larger (by a factor of almost two) than temporary
price increases. However neither of these studies empirically analyzes the asymmetry
characteristics of the output reaction in the face of temporary demand shocks.
Despite this broad evidence, asymmetric reactions to demand shocks have been
unexplored by current theories of price adjustment. Neither time-dependent pricing
models (Taylor, 1979; Calvo, 1983), nor state-dependent adjustment cost models of
(S,s) type (e.g., Sheshinski and Weiss, 1977; Rotemberg, 1982; Caplin and Spulber,
1987; Caballero and Engel, 1993, 2007; Golosov and Lucas, 2007; Gertler and Leahy,
2008; Dotsey et al., 2009; Midrigan, 2011) are able to account for the asymmetry
properties in price dynamics in response to positive and negative exogenous temporary
and permanent shifts in demand.2
In this paper we offer a new theory of firm price setting resting on consumer loss
aversion in an otherwise standard model of monopolistic competition. The resulting
theory provides a novel rationale for the above empirical evidence on asymmetric price
sluggishness. Although there is no hard evidence for a direct link from consumer loss
aversion to price sluggishness, to the best of our knowledge, there is ample evidence
that firms do not adjust their prices flexibly in order to avoid harming their customer
relationships (see, e.g., Fabiani et al. (2006) for a survey of euro area countries, Blinder
et al. (1998) for the United States3, and Hall et al. (2000) for the United Kingdom).4
Furthermore, there is extensive empirical evidence that customers are indeed loss
averse in prices. Kalwani et al. (1990), Mayhew and Winer (1992), Krishnamurthi et al.
(1992), Putler (1992), Hardie et al. (1993), Kalyanaram and Little (1994), Raman and
2Once trend inflation is considered, menu costs can generally explain that prices are more downward
sluggish than upwards (Ball and Mankiw, 1994). By contrast, our model does not rely on the assumption of
trend inflation.
3In their survey, Blinder et al. (1998) additionally find clear evidence that the pricing of those firms for
which the fear of antagonizing their customers through price changes plays an important role is relatively
upward sluggish. Unfortunately, the authors do no distinguish between temporary and permanent shifts in
demand in their survey questions.
4Further evidence for OECD countries is provided by, for example, Fabiani et al. (2004) for Italy, Loupias
and Ricart (2004) for France, Zbaracki et al. (2004) for the United States, Alvarez and Hernando (2005) for
Spain, Amirault et al. (2005) for Canada, Aucremanne and Druant (2005) for Belgium, Stahl (2005) for Ger-
many, Lünnemann and Mathä (2006) for Luxembourg, Langbraaten et al. (2008) for Norway, Hoeberichts
and Stokman (2010) for the Netherlands, Kwapil et al. (2010) for Austria, Martins (2010) for Portugal,
Ólafsson et al. (2011) for Iceland, and Greenslade and Parker (2012) for the United Kingdom.
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Bass (2002), Dossche et al. (2010), and many others find evidence for consumer loss
aversion with respect to many different product categories available in supermarkets.
Furthermore, loss aversion in prices is also well documented in diverse activities such
as restaurant visits (Morgan, 2008), vacation trips (Nicolau, 2008), real estate trade
(Genesove and Mayer, 2001), phone calls (Bidwell et al., 1995), and energy use (Griffin
and Schulman, 2005; Adeyemi and Hunt, 2007; Ryan and Plourde, 2007).
In our model, loss-averse consumers evaluate prices relative to a reference price.
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007, 2009) and Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2005, 2008, 2014)
argue that reference points are determined by agents’ rational expectations about out-
comes from the recent past. There is much empirical evidence suggesting that reference
points are determined by expectations, in concrete situations such as in police perfor-
mance after final offer arbitration (Mas, 2006), in the United States TV show "Deal
or no Deal" (Post et al., 2008), with respect to domestic violence (Card and Dahl,
2011), in cab drivers’ labor supply decisions (Crawford and Meng, 2011), or in the
effort choices of professional golf players (Pope and Schweitzer, 2011). In the con-
text of laboratory experiments, Knetsch and Wong (2009) and Marzilli Ericson and
Fuster (2011) find supporting evidence from exchange experiments and Abeler et al.
(2011) do so through an effort provision experiment. Endogenizing consumers’ refer-
ence prices in this way allows our model to capture that current price changes influence
the consumers’ future reference price and thereby affect the demand functions via what
we call the "reference-price updating effect." This effect rests on the observation that
firms tend to increase the demand for their product by raising their consumers’ refer-
ence price through, for example, setting a "suggested retail price" that is higher than
the price actually charged (Thaler, 1985; Putler, 1992). These pieces of evidence are
consonant with the assumptions underlying our analysis. Our analysis works out the
implications of these assumptions for state-dependent price sluggishness in the form of
asymmetric price adjustment for temporary and permanent demand shocks.
There are only a few other papers that study the implications of consumer loss
aversion on firms’ pricing decisions. In an early account of price rigidity in response to
demand and cost shocks has been presented by Sibly (2002, 2007). In a static environ-
ment, Sibly (2002, 2007) shows that a monopolist may not change prices if she faces
loss averse consumers with fixed, exogenously given reference prices. In their partic-
ularly insightful contributions, Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2008) and Spiegler (2012) ana-
lyze static monopolistic pricing decisions to cost and demand shocks under the assump-
tion that the reference price is determined as a consumer’s recent rational expectations
personal equilibrium in the spirit of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006). Spiegler (2012) shows
that incentives for price rigidity are even stronger for demand shocks compared to cost
shocks. We follow Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2008) and Spiegler (2012) and assume en-
dogenous rational expectations reference price formation, but, by contrast, consider a
dynamic approach to the pricing decision of a monopolistically competitive firm facing
loss averse consumers. Our dynamic approach confirms earlier findings that consumer
loss aversion engenders price rigidity and allows us to study the asymmetry charac-
teristics of pricing reactions to temporary and permanent demand shocks of different
sign. Another study close to ours is Popescu and Wu (2007); although they analyze
optimal pricing strategies in repeated market interactions with loss averse consumers
and endogenous reference prices, they do not analyze the model’s reaction to demand
shocks.
Finally, this paper offers a new microfounded rationale for state-dependent pricing.
The importance of state-dependence for firms’ pricing decisions is well documented.
For instance, in the countries of the euro area (Fabiani et al., 2006; Nicolitsas, 2013),
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Scandinavia (Apel et al., 2005; Langbraaten et al., 2008; Ólafsson et al., 2011), the
United States (Blinder et al., 1998), and Turkey (S¸ahinöz and Saraçog˘lu, 2008), ap-
proximately two third of the firms’ pricing decisions are indeed driven by the current
state of the environment.5 Menu costs, by contrast, are clearly rejected as a significant
driver for deferred price adjustments in each of the empirical studies above.
3 Model
We incorporate reference-dependent preferences and loss aversion into an otherwise
standard model of monopolistic competition. Consumers are price takers and loss
averse with respect to prices. They evaluate prices relative to their reference prices,
which depend on their rational price expectations. Prices higher than the reference
price are associated with utility losses, while prices lower than the reference price are
associated with utility gains. Losses are weighted more heavily than gains of equal
magnitude. Firms are monopolistic competitors, supplying non-durable differentiated
goods. Firms can change their prices freely in each period to maximize their profits.
3.1 Consumers
We follow Sibly (2007) and assume that the representative consumer’s period-utility
Ut depends positively on the consumption of n imperfectly substitutable nondurable
goods qi,t with i ∈ (1, . . . ,n) and negatively on the "loss-aversion ratio" (pi,t/ri,t), i.e.
the ratio of the price pi,t of good i to the consumer’s respective reference price ri,t of the
good. The loss-aversion ratio, which describes how the phenomenon of loss aversion
enters the utility function, may be rationalized in terms of (i) Thaler’s transaction utility
(whereby the total utility that the consumer derives from a good is in part determined
by how the consumer evaluates the quality of the financial terms of the acquisition of
the good (Thaler, 1991)), (ii) Okun’s implicit firm-customer contracts (whereby firms
and customers implicitly agree on fair and stable prices despite fluctuations in demand
(Okun, 1981)), or (iii) Rotemberg’s customer anger or regret (Rotemberg 2005, 2010).
Further approaches that describe reference-dependence in the consumer’s utility func-
tion in terms of a ratio of actual prices to references prices are McDonald and Sibly
(2001, 2005) in the context of loss aversion with respect to wages and Sibly (1996,
2002) in the context of loss aversion with respect to prices and quality.6
The consumer’s preferences in period t are represented by the following utility
function:
Ut (q1,t , ...,qn,t) =
[
n
∑
i=1
((
pi,t
ri,t
)−µ
qi,t
)ρ] 1ρ
, (1)
where 0 < ρ < 1 denotes the degree of substitutability between the different goods.
The parameter µ is an indicator function of the form
µ =
{
Γ for pi,t < ri,t , i.e. gain domain
∆ for pi,t > ri,t , i.e. loss domain
, (2)
5However in the United Kingdom (Hall et al., 2000) and Canada (Amirault et al., 2004) state-dependence
seems to be somewhat less important for firms’ pricing decision.
6Other examples in which prices directly enter the utility function are, for instance, Rosenkranz (2003)
and Rosenkranz and Schmitz (2007) in the context of auctions and Popescu and Wu (2007), Nasiry and
Popescu (2011), and Zhou (2011) in the context of customer loss aversion.
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which describes the degree of the consumer’s loss aversion. For loss averse consumers,
∆ > Γ, i.e. the utility losses from price increases are larger than the utility gains from
price decreases of equal magnitude. The consumer’s reference price ri,t is formed at
the beginning of each period. In the spirit of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006), we assume
that the consumer’s reference price depends on her lagged rational price expectation.
Demand shocks, which may or may not trigger price adjustment, materialize unexpect-
edly in the course of the period and therefore do not enter the information set used by
the consumer at the beginning of the period to form the reference price. Therefore,
there is no instantaneous reaction of the reference price in the shock period even if the
firm immediately adjusts its price in response to the shock. At the beginning of the
next period, however, consumers update their infomation set and adjust their price ex-
pectation accordingly (since they can now infer about the nature of the demand shock
and the corresponding price change). While temporary price changes do not provoke a
change in the consumer’s reference price7, the reference price changes in the period af-
ter the occurrence of a permanent shock. Thus the consumer’s reference price is given
by ri,t = E [pi,t | It−1]. The consumer’s budget constraint is given by
n
∑
i=1
pi,tqi,t = PtYt , (3)
where Yt denotes the consumer’s real income in period t which is assumed to be con-
stant and Pt is the aggregate price index. For simplicity, we abstract from saving. This
implies that consumers are completely myopic.8 In each period the consumer max-
imizes her period-utility function (1) with respect to her budget constraint (3). The
result is the consumer’s period t demand for the differentiated good i which is given by
qi,t(pi,t ,ri,t ,µ) = Pηt
(
pi,t
ri,t
)−µ(η−1) Yt
pηi,t
, (4)
where η = 11−ρ denotes the elasticity of substitution between the different product
varieties. The aggregate price index Pt is given by
Pt =
 n∑
i=1
(
pi,t
/(
pi,t
ri,t
)−µ)1−η 11−η . (5)
We assume that the number of firms n is sufficiently large so that the pricing decision
of a single firm does not affect the aggregate price index. Defining λ = η (1+µ)−µ ,
we can simplify equation (4) to
qi,t(pi,t ,ri,t ,λ ) = rλ−ηi,t p
−λ
i,t P
η
t Yt , (6)
where the parameter λ denotes the price elasticity of demand, which depends on µ and
therefore takes different values for losses and gains. To simplify notation, we define
λ =
{
γ for pi,t < ri,t
δ for pi,t > ri,t
, (7)
7Support for this assumption can be found in the example of sales, i.e. promotions, characterized by non-
permanent price decreases, used by firms to temporarily increase consumers’ demand for their product (see
e.g. Eichenbaum et al., 2011). Sales do not affect the consumers’ reference price. Otherwise firms would not
conduct sales because any downward adjustment of the consumer’s reference price reduces long-run profits
for the firm.
8Evidence to support this assumption is provided by Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2003) who show that
many purchase decisions of non-durable goods take place in economic environments which are characterized
by myopic consumers.
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with δ = η (1+∆)−∆> γ = η (1+Γ)−Γ. Equation (6) indicates that the consumer’s
demand function for good i is kinked at the reference price ri,t . The kink, lying at the
intersection of the two demand curves qi,t(pi,t ,ri,t ,γ) and qi,t(pi,t ,ri,t ,δ ), is given by
the price-quantity combination
(p̂i,t , q̂i,t) =
(
ri,t ,r
−η
i,t P
η
t Yt
)
, (8)
where "̂" denotes the value of a variable at the kink. Changes in the reference price
ri,t give rise to a change of the position of the kink and also shift the demand curve as
a whole. The direction of this shift depends on the sign of the difference λ −η . We
restrict our analysis to λ ≥ η , i.e. we assume that an increase in the reference price
shifts the demand curve outwards and vice versa.9
Needless to say, abstracting from reference-dependence and loss aversion in the
consumer’s preferences represented by utility function (1), restores the standard text-
book consumer demand function for a differentiated good i, given by
qi,t(pi,t) = p
−η
i,t P
η
t Yt . (9)
In what follows, we will use this standard model as a benchmark case, against which
we compare the pricing decisions of a monopolistic competitive firm facing loss averse
consumers.
3.2 Monopolistic Firms
Firms seek to maximize the discounted stream of current and future profits, taking into
account the implications of their current pricing decision for the costumers’ reference
price. For simplicity, we assume a two period time horizon. (This can serve as a rough
approximation for forms of short-sightedness, such as hyperbolic discounting, when
the first-period discount rate exceeds the second-period one.10)
All n firms are identical, enabling us to drop the subscript i. In what follows we
assume that the firm’s total costs are given by Ct(qt) = c2q
2
t , where c is a constant,
implying that marginal costs are linear in output: MCt(qt) = cqt . In the presence of loss
aversion (δ > γ), the downward-sloping demand curve has a concave kink at the current
reference price: p̂t = rt . Thus the firm’s marginal revenue curve is discontinuous at the
kink:
MRt (qt ,rt ,λ ) =
(
1− 1
λ
)(
qt
r(λ−η)t P
η
t Yt
)− 1λ
, (10)
9The positive relationship between reference price and demand has become a common feature in the
marketing sciences (e.g., Thaler, 1985; Putler, 1992; Greenleaf, 1995). It manifests itself, e.g., through the
"suggested retail price," by which raising the consumers’ reference price causes increases in demand (Thaler,
1985). Furthermore, Putler (1992) provides evidence that an extensive use of promotional pricing in the late
80’s had lead to an erosion in demand by lowering consumers’ reference prices.
10Many authors have shown that consumers’ discount rates are generally much higher in the short run
than in the long run (e.g. Loewenstein and Thaler, 1989; Ainslie, 1992; Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992;
Laibson, 1996, 1997). Firm behavior is also often found to be short-sighted for the same reason. The theory
of managerial myopia argues that managers often almost exclusively focus on short-term earnings (either
because they have to meet certain goals or because their career advancement and compensation structure
depends on the firm’s current performance), even if this has adverse long-run effects (Jacobson and Aaker,
1993; Graham et al., 2005; Mizik and Jacobson, 2007; Mizik, 2010). For a review of the early literature refer
to Grant et al. (1996).
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Figure 1: Initial steady state
with λ = γ for the gain domain and λ = δ for the loss domain, respectively. The
interval [MRt (q̂t ,rt ,γ) , MRt (q̂t ,rt ,δ )], where MRt (q̂t ,rt ,γ) <MRt (q̂t ,rt ,δ ), we call
“marginal revenue discontinuity” MRDt(q̂t ,rt ,γ,δ ).
We assume that in the initial steady state, the exogenously given reference price
is rss. Furthermore, in the steady state the firm’s marginal cost curve intersects the
marginal revenue discontinuity, as depicted in Figure 1. To fix ideas, we assume
that initially the marginal cost curve crosses the midpoint of the discontinuity in the
marginal revenue curve.11 This assumption permits us to derive the symmetry charac-
teristics of the responses to positive and negative demand shocks. This implies that the
firm’s optimal price in the initial steady state p∗ss is equal to rss.12
4 Demand Shocks
The demand for each product i is subject to exogenous shocks, which may be temporary
or permanent. These demand shocks, represented by εt , are unexpected and enter the
demand function multiplicatively:
qt(pt ,rt ,λ ,εt) = r
(λ−η)
t p
−λ
t P
η
t Ytεt . (11)
The corresponding marginal revenue functions of the firm are
MRt (qt ,rt ,λ ,εt) =
(
1− 1
λ
)(
qt
r(λ−η)t P
η
t Ytεt
)− 1λ
. (12)
We consider the effects of a demand shock that hits the economy in period t = 0.
The demand shock shifts the marginal revenue curve, along with the marginal revenue
11To satisfy this condition, the slope parameter c of the marginal cost curve has to take the value c =
1
2qss
[MRt (qss,rss,γ)+MRt (qss,rss,δ )]
12The proof is straightforward: Let ν be an arbitrarily small number. Then for prices equal to rss+ν the
firm faces a situation in which marginal revenue is higher than marginal costs and decreasing the price would
raise the firm’s profit, while for prices equal to rss−ν the firm faces a situation in which marginal revenue is
lower than marginal costs and increasing the price would raise the firm’s profit. Thus p∗ss = rss has to be the
profit maximizing price in the initial steady state.
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discontinuity MRDt (q̂t ,rt ,γ,δ ,εt). We define a "small" shock as one that leaves the
marginal cost curve passing through the marginal revenue discontinuity, and a "large"
shock as one that shifts the marginal revenue curve sufficiently so that the marginal
cost curve no longer passes through the marginal revenue discontinuity.
The maximum size of a small shock for the demand function (11) is
εt (λ ) =
(
1− 1
λ
)
r1+ηt
cPηt Yt
, (13)
i.e. εt (λ ) is the shock size for which the marginal cost curve lies exactly on the bound-
aries of the shifted marginal revenue discontinuity MRDt (q̂t ,rt ,γ,δ ,εt (λ )).13 In the
analysis that follows, we will distinguish both between small and large demand shocks
and between temporary and permanent demand shocks.
4.1 Temporary Demand Shocks
For a temporary (one-period) demand shock, the consumers’ reference price is not af-
fected (since information reaches them with a one-period lag and they have rational
expectations). Thus the firm’s price response to the shock is the same as that of a my-
opic firm (which maximizes its current period profit).
Proposition 1: In response to a small temporary shock, prices remain rigid.
As noted, for a sufficiently small demand shock εs0 ≤ ε0 (λ ) the marginal cost curve
still intersects the marginal revenue discontinuity, i.e. MC0 (q̂0)∈MRD0
(
q̂0,rss,γ,δ ,εs0
)
.
Therefore, the prevailing steady state price remains the firm’s profit-maximizing price,14
i.e. p∗0 = p
∗
ss, and we have complete price rigidity. By contrast, the profit-maximizing
quantity changes to q∗0 = r
−η
ss P
η
0 Y0ε
s
0, thus the change of quantity is given by
∆q∗0 =
q∗0
q∗ss
=
εs0
εss
= εs0 6= 1. (14)
This holds true irrespective of the sign of the small temporary demand shock.
Proposition 2: In response to a large temporary shock, prices are more sluggish up-
wards than downwards.
For a large shock, i.e. ε l0 > ε0 (λ ), the marginal cost curve intersects the marginal
revenue curve outside the discontinuity of the latter. Consequently both, a price and a
quantity reaction are induced. The new profit-maximizing price of the firm is
p∗0 =
(
r(λ−η)ss Pη0 Y0ε
l
0
q∗0
) 1
λ
, (15)
while its corresponding profit-maximizing quantity is
q∗0 =
(
1
c
(
1− 1
λ
)) λ
λ+1 (
r(λ−η)ss Pη0 Y0ε
l
0
) 1
λ+1
, (16)
13For ε (δ ), the marginal cost curve intersects the marginal revenue gap on the upper bound, whereas for
ε (γ) it intersects it on the lower bound.
14Compare the proof from Section 3.2.
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where λ = δ for positive and λ = γ for negative shocks, respectively.
In comparison to the standard firm the price reaction of the firm facing loss-averse
consumers in response to a large temporary demand shock is always smaller, whereas
the quantity reaction is always larger. Additionally, prices and quantities are less re-
sponsive to positive than to negative shocks. The intuition is obvious once we decom-
pose the demand shock into the maximum small shock and the remainder:
ε l0 = ε0 (λ )+ ε
rem
0 . (17)
From our theoretical analysis above, the maximum small shock ε0 (λ ) has no price
effects, but feeds one-to-one into demand. This holds true irrespective of the sign of
the shock. By contrast, the remaining shock εrem0 has asymmetric effects. Let q0 be the
quantity corresponding to ε0 (λ ). Then the change in quantity in response to εrem0 is
given by
∆qrem0 =
q∗0
q0
=
(
εrem0
ε0 (λ )
) 1λ+1
. (18)
As can be seen from equation 18, the change of quantity in response to εrem0 de-
pends negatively on λ , the price elasticity of demand. Since by definition δ > γ , the
quantity reaction of the firm facing loss-averse consumers is smaller in response to
large positive temporary demand shocks than to large negative ones. This however im-
plies that prices are also less responsive to positive than to negative large temporary
demand shocks, because the former move the firm along the relatively flat portion of
the demand curve, whereas the latter move it along the relatively steep portion of the
demand curve. This asymmetric sluggishness in the reaction to positive and negative
large temporary demand shocks is a distinct feature of consumer loss aversion and
stands in obvious contrast to the standard textbook case of monopoly pricing.
4.2 Permanent Demand Shocks
Now consider a permanent, demand shock that occurs in period t = 0. Whereas the firm
is assumed to change its price immediately in response to this shock, consumers update
their reference price in the following period t = 1, i.e. r1 = E0[p1]. Consequently, for
price increases (decreases) the demand curve shifts outwards (inwards) and the kink
moves to
(p̂1, q̂1) =
(
r1,(P1/r1)
η Y1ε1
)
. (19)
An outward shift of the demand curve (initiated by an upward adjustment in the refer-
ence price) increases the firm’s long-run profits, whereas an inward shift (initiated by a
downward adjustment of the reference price) lowers them. We term this phenomenon
the “reference-price updating effect.” The firm can anticipate this. Thus, it may have
an incentive to set its price above the level that maximizes its profits in the shock
period p′0 > p
∗
0, therewith exploiting (dampening) the outward (inward) shift of the
demand curve resulting from the upward (downward) adjustment of the consumers’
reference price for positive (negative) permanent shocks.15 Whether this occurs de-
pends on whether the firm’s gain from a price rise relative to p∗0 in terms of future
15Needless to say, setting a price lower than optimal in the shock period with the aim to decrease the
reference price permanently is not a preferable option for the firm.
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Parameter Symbol Value
Discount rate β 0.99
Elasticity of substitution η 5
implying substitutability ρ 0.8
Price elasticity (gain domain) γ 6
Price elasticity (loss domain) δ 12
Loss aversion κ 2
Exogenous nominal income Y 1
Exogenous price index Pt 1
Table 1: Base calibration
profits (Π1(r1 = p′0)> Π1(r1 = p
∗
0), due to the relative rise in the reference price) ex-
ceeds the firm’s loss in terms of present profits (Π0(p′0) < Π0(p
∗
0), since the price p
′
0
is not appropriate for maximizing current profit).
To analyze which effect dominates, we calibrate the model and solve it numerically.
4.3 Calibration
We calibrate the model for a quarterly frequency in accordance with standard values in
the literature. We assume an annual interest rate of 4 percent, which yields a discount
factor β = 0.99. We follow Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) and set the monopolistic
markup to 25 percent, i.e. η = 5, which is also close to the value supported by Erceg et
al. (2000) and which implies that goods are only little substitutable, i.e. ρ = 0.8. Since
we impose λ ≥ η , we set γ = 6 in our base calibration. Loss aversion is measured by
the relative slopes of the demand curves in the gain and loss domain, i.e. κ = δγ . The
empirical literature on loss aversion in prices finds that losses induce demand reactions
approximately twice as large as gains (Tversky and Kahnemann, 1991; Putler, 1992;
Hardie et al., 1993; Griffin and Schulman, 2005; Adeyemi and Hunt, 2007). Therefore,
we set κ = 2. The exogenous nominal income Y and price index Pt are normalized to
unity.16 The base calibration is summarized in Table 1.
4.4 Numerical Simulation
Tables 2 and 3 present the numerical results of our base calibration in the two-period
model. In the tables we report the shock-arc-elasticities of price
(
η˜ε,p = %∆p%∆ε
)
and
output
(
η˜ε,q = %∆q%∆ε
)
in the period of the shock t = 0 for positive and negative tempo-
rary and permanent shocks for the firm facing loss averse consumers.
The results in Tables 2 and 3 confirm the theoretical analysis above for the tempo-
rary shock, summarized in Propositions 1 and 2. However, not all of these results carry
over in the case of permanent demand shocks.
Proposition 3: For all permanent shocks, prices are less sluggish upwards than down-
wards.
In line with the theoretical analysis above, our numerical results in table 2 and 3
indicate that in the case of a permanent shock the firm exploits the "reference-price up-
16All results are completely robust to variations of these numerical values.
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temporary shock permanent shock
ηε,p ηε,q ηε,p ηε,q
εs0 = 1.01 0 1 0.0100 0.8789
εs0 = 1.03 0 1 0.0667 0.1866
ε l0 = 1.05 0.0035 0.9560 0.0755 0.0717
ε l0 = 1.07 0.0232 0.7046 0.0790 0.0216
Table 2: Shock elasticities of price and output in t = 0 to positive permanent demand
shocks, ε0 (γ) = 1.0476
temporary shock permanent shock
ηε,p ηε,q ηε,p ηε,q
εs0 = 0.99 0 1 0 1
εs0 = 0.97 0 1 0 1
ε l0 = 0.95 0.0072 0.9592 0.0012 0.9934
ε l0 = 0.93 0.0484 0.7264 0.0013 0.9927
Table 3: Shock elasticities of price and output in t = 0 to negative permanent demand
shocks; ε0 (δ ) = 0.9524
dating effect" and generally sets a price that is higher than the price it would optimally
set in response to a temporary shock, i.e. p′0 > p
∗
0. For positive permanent demand
shocks this implies that the pricing reaction of the firm is always stronger than for
positive temporary demand shocks for both, small17 and large shocks18. By contrast,
for negative permanent demand shocks firms either do not adjust their prices at all for
sufficiently small shocks or to a considerably lower extent than for negative temporary
shocks.
As a consequence, price sluggishness is considerably less pronounced for positive
than for negative permanent demand shocks. The asymmetry of the price reaction
to positive and negative shocks therefore reverses, when moving from temporary to
permanent shocks. While this result may seem surprising at first glance, it is straight-
forward intuitively: As noted, for temporary shocks, consumers abstract from updating
their reference price. Therefore, the firm does not risk to suffer from a downward ad-
justment of the consumers’ reference price, when encountering a temporary drop in
demand with a price reduction. On the other hand, for positive temporary shocks, the
firm cannot generate permanent increases in demand due to upward-adjustments of the
reference price. Since consumers react more sensitive to price increases relative to price
decreases, the price and quantity reactions are smaller for positive temporary shocks
compared to negative ones. By contrast, for permanent demand shocks, the firm ex-
ploits the positive "reference-price updating effect" which follows from price increases
in response to positive shocks, whereas it tries to avoid the negative "reference-price
updating effect" which follows from price decrease in response to negative shocks.19
17Of course, one can find a range of shocks, which are small enough to induce full price rigidity for
permanent positive shocks. Due to the reference-price updating effect, this threshold is, however, very small.
Given the base calibration, the threshold value for a sufficiently small positive shock is ε0 (δ ) = 1.0087.
18Our numerical analysis indicates, however, that the positive reference-price updating effect is never
strong enough to invalidate the general result that the pricing reaction of the firm facing loss averse consumers
is more sluggish compared to the standard firm.
19Since the firm avoids price reductions, which lead to downward-adjustments in the reference price, but
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5 Conclusion
In contrast to the standard time-dependent and state-dependent models of price slug-
gishness, our theory of price adjustment is able to account for asymmetric price and
quantity responses to positive and negative temporary and permanent shocks of equal
magnitude. In contrast to the New Keynesian literature, our explanation of price adjust-
ment is thoroughly microfounded, without recourse to ad hoc assumptions concerning
the frequency of price changes or physical costs of price adjustments.
There are many avenues of future research. Consideration of heterogeneous firms
and multi-product firms will enable this model to generate asynchronous price changes,
as well as the simultaneous occurrence of large and small price changes, and heteroge-
neous frequency of price changes across products. Extending the model to a stochastic
environment will generate testable implications concerning the variability of individ-
ual prices. Furthermore, our model needs to be incorporated into a general equilibrium
setting to validate the predictions of our theory.
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Appendix
1. Demand Curve of Loss Averse Consumers
The loss averse consumer maximizes her utility function (1) subject to her budget con-
straint (3). The corresponding Lagrangian problem reads:
max
qi,t
L=
[
n
∑
i=1
((
pi,t
ri,t
)−µ
qi,t
)ρ] 1ρ
−ϕ
[
n
∑
i=1
pi,tqi,t −PtYt
]
, (20)
where ϕ is the Lagrangian multiplier. The first-order condition of the Lagrangian func-
tion (20) is
∂Lt
∂qi,t
=
1
ρ
[
n
∑
i=1
((
pi,t
ri,t
)−µ
qi,t
)ρ] 1ρ−1(
pi,t
ri,t
)−µρ
qρ−1i,t ρ−ϕ pi,t = 0. (21)
We collect all terms including demand components on the left hand side
qρ−1i,t
[
n
∑
i=1
((
pi,t
ri,t
)−µ
qi,t
)ρ] 1−ρρ
= ϕ pi,t
(
pi,t
ri,t
)µρ
, (22)
and simplify the exponentials
qi,t
[
n
∑
i=1
((
pi,t
ri,t
)−µ
qi,t
)ρ]− 1ρ
=
(
ϕ pi,t
(
pi,t
ri,t
)µρ) 1ρ−1
. (23)
We define overall demand according to a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) aggregate, which
reads
qt =
[
n
∑
i=1
((
pi,t
ri,t
)−µ
qi,t
)ρ] 1ρ
. (24)
Applying (24) as well as the definition of the elasticity of substitution (i.e. η = 11−ρ ),
we can simplify (23) to
qi,t = (ϕ pi,t)−η
(
pi,t
ri,t
)−µ(η−1)
qt . (25)
To determine the Lagrangian multiplier ϕ , we plug (25) into (24)
qt =
 n∑
i=1
((
pi,t
ri,t
)−µ
(ϕ pi,t)−η
(
pi,t
ri,t
)−µ(η−1)
qt
) η−1
η

η
η−1
, (26)
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which after some simple manipulations yields
ϕ =
 n∑
i=1
(
pi,t
/(
pi,t
ri,t
)−µ)1−η 1η−1 ≡ P−1t . (27)
We define the inverse of the Lagrangian multiplier ϕ as the overall price index Pt .
Plugging (27) back into (25) yields
qi,t = P
η
t
(
pi,t
ri,t
)−µ(η−1)
p−ηi,t qt . (28)
Applying the budget constraint (3) yields
qi,t = P
η
t
(
pi,t
ri,t
)−µ(η−1)
p−ηi,t Yt . (29)
Finally, we simplify (29) using the definition λ = η(1+ µ)− µ , which yields the
demand curve for the differentiated good i
qi,t = r
λ−η
i,t p
−λ
i,t P
η
t Yt (30)
Including the shock term, equation (30) reads
qi,t = r
λ−η
i,t p
−λ
i,t P
η
t Ytεt . (31)
2. Price and Quantity at the Kink
The kink is given by the particular price at which the two demand curves intersect, i.e.
qi,t(pi,t ,ri,t ,γ) = qi,t(pi,t ,ri,t ,δ ). Given (31) and the definition of λ from equation (7)
it must hold that
rγ−ηi,t p
−γ
i,t P
η
t Ytεt = r
δ−η
i,t p
−δ
i,t P
η
t Ytεt , (32)
which simplifies to
rγ−ηi,t p
−γ
i,t = r
δ−η
i,t p
−δ
i,t . (33)
Sorting terms yields
pδ−γi,t = r
δ−η−γ+η
i,t . (34)
From (34) it is obvious that pi,t = ri,t at the kink. Plugging (34) back into (31) gives
the quantity at the kink
qi,t = r
−η
i,t P
η
t Ytεt . (35)
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6.1 3. Demand Curve of Standard Consumers
The standard consumer (i.e. the non-loss averse consumer) maximizes her utility func-
tion
Ut (q1,t , ...,qn,t) =
[
n
∑
i=1
qρi,t
] 1
ρ
, (36)
subject to her budget constraint (3). The corresponding Lagrangian problem reads:
max
qi,t
L=
[
n
∑
i=1
qρi,t
] 1
ρ
−φ
[
n
∑
i=1
pi,tqi,t −PtYt
]
, (37)
where φ is the Lagrangian multiplier for the standard textbook problem. The first-order
condition of the Lagrangian problem (37) is
∂Lt
∂qi,t
=
1
ρ
[
n
∑
i=1
qρi,t
] 1
ρ−1
qρ−1i,t ρ−φ pi,t = 0. (38)
We collect all terms including demand components on the left hand side and simplify
the exponentials
qi,t
[
n
∑
i=1
qρi,t
]− 1ρ
= (φ pi,t)
1
ρ−1 . (39)
We define overall demand for the standard consumer by a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)
aggregate of the form
qt =
[
n
∑
i=1
qρi,t
] 1
ρ
. (40)
Applying (40) as well as the definition of the elasticity of substitution, we can simplify
(39) to
qi,t = (φ pi,t)−η qt . (41)
To determine the Lagrangian multiplier φ , we plug (41) into (40)
qt =
[
n
∑
i=1
(
(φ pi,t)−η qt
) η−1
η
] η
η−1
, (42)
which after some simple manipulations yields
φ =
[
n
∑
i=1
p1−ηi,t
] 1
η−1
≡ P−1t . (43)
We define the inverse of the Lagrangian multiplier φ as the overall price index P¯t for
the standard textbook problem. Plugging (43) back into (41) yields
qi,t = P
η
t p
−η
i,t qt . (44)
Applying the budget constraint (3) yields the demand curve for the differentiated good
i for the standard consumer
qi,t = p
−η
i,t P
η
t Yt (45)
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Including the shock term, equation (45) reads
qi,t = p
−η
i,t P
η
t Ytεt . (46)
4. Marginal Revenue Curve
Since all firms are assumed to be identical, we drop the subscript i for the firm deriva-
tions. Revenue is given by
Rt = pt(qt ,rt ,λ ,εt)qt =
(
qt
r(λ−η)t P
η
t Ytεt
)− 1λ
qt , (47)
or in short
Rt =
(
r(λ−η)t P
η
t Ytεt
) 1
λ q
1− 1λ
t . (48)
The first-order condition with respect to qt yields the marginal revenue curve
MRt =
∂Rt
∂qt
=
(
1− 1
λ
)(
qt
r(λ−η)t P
η
t Ytεt
)− 1λ
. (49)
5. Critical Shock Size
The critical value for the small shock is given by the particular shock εt (λ ), for which
the marginal cost curve exactly intersects the critical bounds of the shifted marginal
revenue discontinuity, i.e.
MCt (q∗t )
!
=MRt (q∗t ,rt ,λ ,εt (λ )) , (50)
where MCt(qt) =
∂C(qt )
∂qt = cqt , with Ct(qt) =
c
2q
2
t . Evaluating the marginal revenue
curve (49) and the marginal cost curve at the post-shock optimum yields
cq∗t =
(
1− 1
λ
)(
q∗t
ε (λ )r(λ−η)t P
η
t Yt
)− 1λ
. (51)
From the analysis of small shocks we know that the new quantity of the maximum
small shock is q∗t = εt (λ )r
−η
t P
η
t Yt . Applying this, we obtain
cεt (λ )r−ηt P
η
t Yt =
(
1− 1
λ
)(
εt (λ )r−ηt P
η
t Yt
εt (λ )r
(λ−η)
t P
η
t Yt
)− 1λ
. (52)
Solving for εt (λ ) yields the critical shock size
εt (λ ) =
(
1− 1
λ
)
r1+ηt
cPηt Yt
. (53)
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6. Optimal Price and Quantity in Reaction to a Large Shock for the
Myopic Firm
The new optimal price lies at the intersection of the marginal cost curve with the shifted
marginal revenue curve, which by definition is outside the marginal revenue disconti-
nuity
MCt (q∗t ,εt) =MRt (q
∗
t ,rt ,λ ,εt) . (54)
Applying the respective functions yields
cq∗t =
(
1− 1
λ
)(
q∗t
r(λ−η)t P
η
t Ytεt
)− 1λ
. (55)
Solving this equation for q, we obtain
q∗t =
(
1
c
(
1− 1
λ
)) λ
λ+1 (
r(λ−η)t P
η
t Ytεt
) 1
λ+1
. (56)
The optimal price can be calculated by plugging q∗t into the inverse demand curve,
given by
p∗t =
(
q∗t
r(λ−η)t P
η
t Ytεt
)− 1λ
. (57)
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